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Estimate show that businesses will lose approximately 5% of revenue annually to occupational 
fraud.   A small business generating $5 million in annual revenue will be estimated to lose 
$250,000 annually to fraud.  The small business owners, with only a few employees, do not have 
the luxury an internal audit department to keep fraud in check.   The small business owners must 
rely on themselves to be the audit department and it has to happen in a cost effective manner.   In 
order to combat the possibility of fraud, the small business owner must first be familiar with the 
concepts of the fraud models.  The fraud triangle theory states that three elements, pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization, must be present for fraud to occur.  The small business owner 
can deter fraud by eliminating one of the elements.   Opportunity can be weakened with the 
segregation of certain duties, requiring mandatory vacations, monthly account reconciliations 
and analysis.  Capability, must be considered when evaluating how fraud could occur.   Open 
communication and education of fraud awareness is also a vital tool in deterring fraud. 
Employees should be made aware that management is conscious of the possibility of 
occupational fraud and that such actions will not be tolerated.  The small business owner does 
not need to spend a lot of money on fraud deterrence measures.  Establishing firm policies, 
communicating with employees and creating internal controls are all cost effective deterrents to 
combat the opportunity and capability of occupational fraud. 
 
  




Small businesses are unique because of their size. This enables them to adapt to customer 
requests, respond quickly to their competition and provide gainful employment.   According to 
the United States Census Bureau Survey, small businesses (with less than 500 employees) 
provided employment for 59.8 million people and generated payrolls in excess of 2.2 billion 
dollars (see Table1).   Firms employing 500 people or more provided employment for 60.7 
million people and generated payrolls in excess of 2.8 billion dollars.   Non-employer firms 
defined in this chart are businesses with no employees or payroll such as solo practitioners.   
Table 1 
U.S. Census Bureau Survey 2007  
 
U.S. Census Bureau 








                     
57,170,715  
             
120,604,265  
               
5,026,778,232  
         
30,738,533,467  
Non-employer firms  
                     
21,708,021   n/a   n/a  
               
991,791,563  
Firms with 1 to 499 employees  
                     
12,577,567  
                
59,866,924  
               
2,204,837,721  
         
11,380,080,684  
Firms with 500 employees or 
more 
                        
1,177,106  
                
60,737,341  
               
2,821,940,511  
         
18,366,661,220  
Table1 Note: Data is combined for ease of reading. The full chart can be found in Appendix A 
 
Although the data indicates that small businesses can compete with larger firms, it is also the 
small business’ size that is one of the biggest downfalls.   Small businesses are more susceptible 
to occupational fraud.    According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”) 
2010 Report to the Nations, small businesses are disproportionately victimized by occupational 
fraud because small organizations are typically lacking in anti-fraud controls compared to their 
larger counterparts.  (Ratley, 2012)   Some of their weaknesses against fraud are the lack of 
available resources or the lack of the basic understanding of the fraud models.   Another 
weakness is the simple attitude that fraud could never occur at their business.  Increasing the 




small business owner’s education and awareness of the two predominant fraud models, 
specifically the opportunity side of the fraud triangle and the capability side of the fraud 
diamond, will enable him/her to deter fraud without adding additional resources.   Establishing 
firm policies, communicating with employees and developing consistent internal controls are 
cost effective deterrents for the small business owner to combat the opportunity and capability of 
occupational fraud. 
The Reason Small Businesses Are Susceptible To Fraud.  
In the article “Fraud Awareness in Small Business” published in The National Public 
Accountant, C. Lavery, D. Lindberg, and K. Razaki stated there are three reasons small 
businesses are considered to be the most vulnerable to fraud.  First, the very size of a small 
business limits its ability to segregate duties or functions related to authorizing, record keeping 
and physically safeguarding assets.  The opportunity to commit fraud is increased when internal 
controls are weakened by the lack of segregation.  Second, smaller businesses often overlook the 
importance of routine accounting functions such as account reconciliations and specific account 
analyses.  Third, the management and employees of the company may not have adequate fraud 
awareness.    It is also very common for the management of smaller businesses to believe that the 
close relationships that exist among the employees will prevent fraud from being committed.  
These feelings of trust may in fact create the environment of opportunity to commit fraud.  
There is no state or federal legislation that requires a privately held small business to 
combat fraud.  The anti-fraud legislations only apply to publically traded companies.  A small 
business may be required by a commercial lender to produce audited financial statements as part 
of their loan agreement.   If a small business is required to produce such statements, an 
independent certified public accountant would be required to conduct an audit of the statements 
in accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and specifically Statement on 




Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud (“SAS 99”).   SAS 99 is an auditing 
statement issued by the Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and became effective for audits of financial statements produced after December 
15, 2002. (AICPA, 2002) SAS 99 requires auditors to consider fraud and identify risks of 
material misstatement due to fraud.   SAS 99 does not require a full fraud audit of the business; it 
is a guideline for auditors when rendering an opinion on the factual accuracy of the financial 
statements.   In the process of conducting such an audit occupational fraud may be discovered; 
however if a small business is not required by a lender to produce audited financial statements, 
the burden of combating fraud falls to the small business only.    
Cost of Fraud to the small business owner  
The ACFE has produced a biennial survey since 2002 entitled “Report to the Nations on 
Occupational Fraud and Abuse” that is based on actual cases reported by Certified Fraud 
Examiners (“CFE”) throughout the world.   The 2012 report reflects data from 1,388 
occupational fraud cases that were reported by the CFE’s that investigated them.  The 2010 
report reflects data from 1,843 cases.  Participants of the survey estimate that the typical 
organization will lose 5% of revenue to fraud each year. Applied to the 2011 Gross World 
Product, 5% loss translates to potential annual fraud loss of $3.5 trillion. (Ratley, 2012)  The 
median loss caused by fraud in the 2012 survey was $140,000 and the fraud lasted approximately 
18 months before detection.    
The ACFE research indicates that occupational fraud falls into three categories:   
1. Asset misappropriation schemes:  An employee steals or misuses the company 
resources (e.g. theft of cash, false billing schemes or inflated expense reports.) 




2. Corruption schemes in which an employee misuses his/her position within a 
business transaction in order to gain a direct or indirect personal benefit (e.g. 
bribery or conflicts of interest.) 
3. Financial statement fraud:  An employee intentionally causes a misstatement or 
omission of material information in the business financial reports (e.g. recording 
fictitious revenue, understating expenses, inflating assets.) 
The chart below reflects data from the ACFE reports issued in 2012, 2010 and 2008.  In the last 
three years the survey was conducted, asset misappropriation was the most prevalent fraud 
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Primary Internal Control Weakness Observed by 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE)  
2012
2010
The ACFE survey revealed that occupational fraud is a significant threat to small businesses. The 
smaller businesses within the study suffered the largest losses because they employ fewer anti-
fraud controls which increase the opportunity for fraud to occur.    Comparing data from the 
2012 and 2010 surveys, lack of internal controls represents the largest weakness observed by 
CFE’s in fraud cases followed by overriding internal controls and lack of management review.  
 
 The detection of occupational fraud cases is often a critical moment for the small 
business.   Decisions must be made quickly to mitigate losses and a thorough investigation must 
be completed.   The method of detection can open or close several options for a business.  The 
outcome may vary substantially if management learns of an alleged fraud from an anonymous 
source as opposed to law enforcement. (Ratley, 2012)    The ACFE survey results indicate that a 
tip is still the most prevalent trend in detecting frauds.   Of the cases described in 2012 and 2010, 
*Other category not included in 2010 Report 
Table 2 




reporting a tip of the alleged fraud was highest the detection method at 43.3% and 40.4% 
respectively. 
*Other category not included in 2010 Report 
 
The detection tip percentage is further broken down in the list below.   Tips from employees to 
management or a person of authority regarding occupational fraud occurring at the business was 
at 50% followed by information from a customer at 22.1% and an anonymous tip at 12.4%.  
Education of employees on definition of fraud and developing a procedure that will allow 
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The Fraud Triangle and Fraud Diamond  
 Before discussing the deterrents to occupational fraud in the small business, knowledge 
of why an employee may commit fraud must be understood.   The Fraud Triangle and The Fraud 
Pyramid are models for explaining factors. 
The fraud triangle originated from Donald Cressey’s hypothesis published in "Other 
People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement.”  Cressey’s theory 
discusses persons of trust having a non-sharable financial problem or pressure.   This problem 
can be secretly resolved by violating the position of trust by using the opportunities available to 
them.   Finally, the perpetrator adjusts his/her conceptions of himself/herself or rationalizes the 
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Pressure:   The first side of the triangle is represented by need for money, whether actual 
or just the desire for it. (Kapp/Heslop, 2011)   The pressure serves as the spark to motivate 
the potential fraudster to start investigating and weighing the options of occupational fraud.  
Opportunity:   The second side of the triangle represents the ability to commit fraud with 
little or no probability of the potential fraudster getting caught.   The opportunity is improved 
by weak internal controls or an employee having direct access to liquid assets such as cash, 
with little or no oversight.  (Kapp/Heslop, 2011) 
Rationalization:   The third side of the triangle is the potential fraudster’s justification of 
the act. (Kapp/Heslop, 2011)  Some examples of rationalizations are:  
“This is only a loan, I will pay it back”  
  “I am providing for my family.” 
  “My employer is underpaying/cheating me.” 
  “My employer is dishonest to others.  They deserve to be fleeced” 
 
Another theory that expands on the fraud triangle is the fraud diamond.  The fraud 
diamond theory, introduced by David Wolfe and Dana Hermanson, enhanced Cressey’s fraud 
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Wolf and Hermanson, through their experiences in investigating frauds, proposed that not 
only do the pressure, need and rationalization need to be present to commit fraud, but capability. 
(Wolf and Hermanson, 2004)   Capability is someone with a high position/function, high 
intelligence, confidence/ego, and good coercion skills.  The person must also be a convincing liar 
and be immune to the inherent stress brought on by perpetrating a fraud. 
1. A person’s position with the company may create the opportunity for fraud not 
available to others.   The higher the person’s function gives the potential fraudster 
more information of the company systems and access to them.     
2. The person committing fraud is smart enough to understand and exploit internal 
controls and weakness and to use their position and authorized access within the 
company to the greatest advantage. 
3. The fraudster must have a strong ego and great confidence that he/she will not be 
detected or they believe they can talk their way out of the matter if discovered. 
4. Successful fraudsters can coerce others to commit or conceal fraud.  A strong 
personality can convince someone else to go along with the fraud or at a minimum 
look the other way and stay quiet. 
5. Fraudsters must be effective liars.   To avoid detection, they must look auditors, 
supervisors and others in the eye and lie convincingly.   They must also have the 
skills to keep track of the lies so their story remains consistent.  
6. Committing and managing fraud is stressful. Risk of detection, the possible personal 
ramifications and the need to conceal the fraud on a daily basis are all stress factors 
that must be managed by the fraudster.    
 




Case:   TeriLyn Norwood 
 TeriLyn Norwood was the ideal employee.  The office worker, who kept taking on more 
responsibilities just because the jobs needed to be done, was becoming more trusted by her 
employer.   In no time at all she was completely in charge of the human resource and accounts 
payable functions for a small truck manufacturing company in Hartford Connecticut.  (Wilder, 
2005)   Unbeknownst to her employer, Norwood’s personal life was in turmoil.   She had 
recently gone through a divorce and owed back child support in the amount of $20,000.  Under 
California law, Norwood had to pay the back child support or serve a jail sentence.  She 
approached her employer inquiring about financial assistance and was denied.  The pressure was 
mounting.  Norwood saw no other way out and embarked on a four month scheme in which she 
stole $18,000 from her employer. (Wilder, 2005)    
The asset manipulation was quite easy.  She just simply placed a label with her name on 
company check over the original payee’s name.   Prior to her first theft, Norwood evaluated the 
probability of her employer discovering her fraud and found it to extremely low. Norwood was 
aware that the office manager only balanced the bank account off of the bank statement and 
check run produced by the accounting system.  The office manager never bothered to look at the 
actual cancelled checks.  (Wilder, 2005)    Norwood saw a weakness in the accounting cycle as 
her opportunity to steal. Norwood’s fraud was not discovered through internal controls but rather 
by meticulous bank teller.  The bank teller simply lifted the label off of the check and revealed 
the actual payee of the check.  (Norwood, 2003)   Norwood was convicted of embezzlement and 
sentenced to two years in prison.    
A positive pay system instituted at Norwood’s employer would have discovered the fraud 
immediately. At a minimum, management should be reviewing the bank statements and the 




actual cancelled checks.  Knowing there was a positive pay system in place would have most 
likely stopped Norwood from attempting the theft in the first place.  The opportunity would not 
have been available to her. 
After the incident, Norwood’s employer emphasized attempting theft would be met with 
serious consequences; the next employee at Norwood’s old position also stole from the company.   
As a result, the employer now has outsourced the accounts payable and receivable functions for 
the company.  (Wilder, 2005) 
Case:  Amy Wilson  
Amy Wilson was the office manager for a small manufacturing firm in Indiana.    Wilson 
was described as a hard worker.   She came in early and stayed late.  Her employer was confident 
in leaving the day to day operations of the business in her hands while he enjoyed the fruits of 
his labors.   Wilson found that her theft was easy because her employer was not interested in 
internal controls.   The one control in place was that Wilson did not have check signing 
privileges.    
Wilson’s pressure arrived in the form of legal trouble for one of her children.   There was 
an altercation with the law and she needed funds to pay an attorney to represent her son in court.  
(Wilson, 2013)   Since she was in charge of all aspects of accounts payable she simply made a 
check out to herself in the accounting system test module and forged an authorized signature.  
Wilson vowed to herself that it was only a loan and she would repay the funds as soon as 
possible. (Wilson, 2013)   Her son’s legal problems were resolved and no one noticed the 
missing funds.    Wilson soon found she became addicted to the money.  She began to use the 
funds for personal items such as to pay her monthly credit card bill and to help friends and 




family that encountered financial hardships.   In Wilson’s own words, she became “An 
overachiever and people pleaser, I thrived on their appreciation of ‘my generosity’ and on my 
status as their savior.” (Wilson, 2013)   
Wilson hid her fraud in a cost of goods account for her employer’s largest customer.   
When the CPA firms noticed the increase in the account activity over the previous year, they 
suggested doing a more detailed analysis.   The employer rebuked the suggestion stating it was a 
waste of money. (Wilson, 2013)    It was not her employer, internal controls or the outside CPA 
firm that discovered Wilson’s theft; it was her own credit card’s fraud department.   They had 
noticed that the payments were being made with a company check and contacted the employer.   
Wilson embezzled over $345,000 from her employer over a four year period and pled guilty to 
eight counts of forgery and theft and was sentenced to six years in prison.     
In both the Norwood and Wilson cases, the small business owners failed to recognize 
opportunities for fraud within their systems or the capabilities of employees working for them.   
Norwood’s and Wilson’s employers used trust as an internal control and it failed.  Both Norwood 
and Wilson served their jail sentences and now have to explain to future employers that they are 
convicted felons.   Both women also work as motivational speakers for The Pros and The Cons, 
an organization that educates businesses on fraud prevention using both industry professionals 
and those convicted of fraud crimes. (http://www.theprosandthecons.com/) 
 
Case:  U.F.C.W. Local 1776. 
United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 (“The Local”) employed 75 people in 
Pennsylvania, three of whom made up the accounting department, which was responsible for $14 
million in revenue each year.   The Local utilized a very manual system.  Schedules were still 




completed by hand and then analyzed.  Information had to be compiled from two or three 
different systems to get information needed for simple transactions such as bank account 
reconciliation.  Over the years some automation of the systems was implemented to improve 
efficiency, and with every request made to a supervisor, it was answered with “do whatever 
needs to be done.”   The only request that was constantly denied was additional help.    The 
Controller had autonomy over all matters financial and the complete trust of management and the 
governing board.   
The Local was required by its financial lender to produce audited financial statements 
yearly.   Once per year, an independent auditor would verify the financial statements.   The Local 
used the same auditor for 12 years.  Since the Local is not a publically traded company, they 
were not required to rotate audit partners as required by Sarbanes Oxley Act (“SOX”).  The 
auditor’s main job was to verify the accuracy of the statements, not to detect fraud.   They did 
modify some of their methods after the enactment of SOX and the issuance of SAS 99, including 
requesting last minute schedules of accounts not normally analyzed, and asking the accounting 
department staff if they were aware of any fraud.     
Humans are creatures of habit and that includes auditors.  Every year there were specific 
accounts that were requested for more detailed analysis during the audit.  The high volume 
accounts that were the heart of the financial statements were always in the review.   Smaller 
accounts that had a significant difference, approximately 5%, in the account balance from the 
previous year would require specific information or at least an explanation to the auditors.   If an 
account had a percentage difference under 5% from the previous year, the auditors would not 
question it.  Those accounts were the best place to conduct any fraud.   




The Controller instituted certain internal control policies to protect the Local from 
possible fraud.    
1. A request was made to utilize another person from a different department to 
check in the cash receipts and make deposits.   The work did not require a full 
time person and it added another layer of separation for the accounting staff.    
2. A policy was written that all nonrecurring payables over $500.00 have approval 
of a department head and an executive committee member.   Normal and 
reoccurring payables such as the electric and phone bills were only reviewed by 
the Controller but the invoice presented from a local auto repair shop required 
two signatures on it before the invoice would be released for payment.    
3. All charges to the corporate credit card also had to have two signatures of a 
department head and an executive committee member before it would be 
processed.    
4. Only two members of the accounting staff could enter a new vendor in the 
system.    If the Controller was unavailable to do it, a report could be generated 
for review by management.    
The Controller reported no incidents of occupational fraud within the accounting 
department.    
Case:  Intercool, Inc.,  
Intercool, Inc. located in Carrollton, Texas, does approximately 7 million dollars a year in 
construction and leasing sales with 12 full time employees.   At Intercool, the Controller is the 




accounting department, including receivables, invoicing, entering and paying accounts payables, 
reconciling the bank account and creating the payroll files.  At no time was a background or 
credit check conducted on the Controller. Trust is the internal control. 
In order to deter fraud, Intercool is considering: 
1. Segregation of duties.   Any segregation of the accounting function would be an 
improvement.   One person should not be responsible for the entire accounting 
cycle; checks and balances are needed.  
2. A positive pay system.   Intercool management should implement a positive pay 
system.  The larger financial institutions offer this service at little or no cost to 
the customer.  
3. Diligence with accounts receivable.  Intercool management needs to be more 
diligent with accounts receivable in the leasing business.   Management is fully 
aware of the funds owed in the construction and design side of the business.  
They are dealing with much larger invoices and receivables.   The leasing side is 
vulnerable because the funds arrive in much smaller increments.   It would be 
easy to divert a few hundred dollars here and there from customers into a bank 
account that was not the Company’s.    
The Controller and management have discussed the issue of segregation of duties which 
is a critical need.    They agree it is an issue and it does not make good business sense to leave 
the organization so vulnerable.  Future discussions are planned to improve the situation.    
Although Intercool has not had any known issues with occupational fraud in the past, there are 




suggestions of a $100,000 embezzlement from about seven years ago that have not been 
substantiated. 
Trust should not be used as a valid internal control. Both Local 1776 and Intercool both 
used trust as an internal control, but this needs to be augmented with practices and procedures to 
reduce potential fraud.  
Best practices for the Small Business Owner. 
 Fraud affects small-sized companies because there is often a high level of trust among 
management and staff.   This raises the confidence of the would-be perpetrators because they do 
not believe anyone would ever suspect them of fraud. Familiarity breeds a level of complacency 
that results in a higher susceptibility to fraud.   Implementing good business practice involves 
identifying the critical responsibilities that must be done to keep a business in working order, and 
having the discipline to ensure that those tasks are carried out consistently and regularly. A best 
practice is just an improvement over existing systems and in this case the best practice is to deter 
occupational fraud.  Small businesses can implement best practices through policies and 
oversight that are an inexpensive way to combat fraud.     Some examples of best practices are:  
1. Separate as much of the accounting functions as possible.  One person should not 
be responsible for an entire accounting cycle.   If segregation of duties is not 
feasible due to the lack of staffing, then consider job rotations.  Job rotations will 
limit the opportunity for fraud by having employees cross check others work on a 
monthly basis. 
2. Implement dual signatures on checks/Positive Pay Systems.  Requiring multiple 
signatures on payment instruments is in itself a check and balance.  Two sets of 




eyes are reviewing every check leaving the business.  If dual signatures are not 
feasible, a positive pay system will allow the financial institutions to be the 
second review.  Any discrepancies to the positive pay system must be reported to 
someone other than the person in charge of the accounts payable function.  
3. Conduct background and credit checks on anyone handling company funds.  
Employees with credit problems could be potential problems for the small 
business owner. (Johnston/Spencer, 2011) 
4. Require mandatory vacations of accounting staff.  It is a red flag if the employee 
does not want to be away from the office.  (Laufer, 2011) Fraudsters need to 
control the scheme and must be present to do so.  Another employee covering 
their desk while the fraudster is away risks detection of the fraud.     
5. Restrict the use of company credit to all employees.   Make a policy that advance 
approval must be obtained prior to using the credit.  Request original receipts 
from employees and have management review the monthly statements.     
6. Management must review key reports on a regular basis.  This review should 
include potential fraud areas such as new vendors, credit memos, inventory write 
off and bad debt reports on a regular basis.  
7. Accounts need to be reconciled in a timely fashion.  Cash accounts are extremely 
susceptible to fraud and should be reviewed consistently for accuracy.      
Even in the absence of actual internal controls, the perception that the owner is checking up on 
business operations can serve as a deterrent. (Kapp, 2011)   Best practices are not just about 




getting your businesses in order, it is about setting up your business for the challenges and 
opportunities it will face in the future. 
Open communication 
 The small business owner can use communication to prevent fraud.  By discussing it 
openly within the entire organization it may give pause to a capable employee who has seen an 
opportunity within the system to commit fraud.   Some examples of open communication are: 
1. Conduct basic fraud awareness training.   Gather all the employees and discuss what is 
expected and how an employee can report a suspected fraud. (Biery, 2012) 
2. Periodically remind employees of fraud awareness.   Forward recent news articles of 
occupational fraud with the reminder that every employee is responsible for preventing 
and detecting fraud.  (Biery, 2012)  
3. Write a mission statement that is focused on ethics and the intention of a fraud-free work 
environment.  (Lefebvre, 2012) 
Setting a clear and open tone from the top of the business stating that fraud will not be tolerated 
is an inexpensive way for the small business to combat fraud.   The potential fraudster will see 
fewer opportunities if management is openly communicating that they are aware of frauds and 
are actively looking to prevent it.    
Conclusion 
The ACFE survey of fraud examiners estimates that businesses will lose approximately 
5% of revenue annually to occupational fraud.   A small business creating $5 million in annual 
revenue will be estimated to lose $250,000 annually to fraud.   Small businesses are found to be 




disproportionately victimized by occupational fraud because they are typically lacking in anti-
fraud controls compared to their larger counterparts.  Small businesses do not have the structure 
or guidelines of state or federal legislation to assist them in the fight against occupational fraud; 
therefore, they must take it upon themselves to deter it prior to it occurring.   In order to combat 
the possibility of fraud, the small business owner must first be familiar with the concepts of the 
fraud models.  The fraud triangle theory states that three elements, pressure, opportunity, 
rationalization, must be present for fraud to occur.      The small business owner can deter fraud 
by eliminating one of the elements.   Opportunity can be weakened with the segregation of 
certain duties, requiring mandatory vacations, monthly account reconciliations and analysis.   
The fraud diamond adds a fourth element, capability, which must be considered when 
considering how fraud could occur. The small business owner should explicitly assess the 
capabilities of key personnel with background and credit checks.  There is also no substitute for 
spending some time with a person to gain insight.  When and if an employee’s capabilities 
present significant risk factors, the small business owner must respond with stronger internal 
controls or enhanced audit testing. 
 Implementing best practices, openly communicating and educating staff on fraud 
awareness is also a vital tool in deterring fraud.   Staff should be trained on what to look for and 
devise a system of how fraud can be reported if it is discovered.    Employees should be made 
aware that management is conscious of the possibility of occupational fraud and that such actions 
will not be tolerated.   Opportunity for a potential capable fraudster is further closed when the 
employee believe they may get caught.     
 The small business does not have to tackle the issue of fraud deterrence alone.  There are 
organizations, for example the ACFE, that offer free information such as the fraud check list 




attached in Appendix B, that can be used as a guideline in setting up fraud deterrence practices.  
The small business owner does not need to spend a lot of money on fraud deterrence measures.  
Establishing firm policies, communication with employees and consistent internal controls are all 
cost effective deterrents to combat the opportunity and capability of occupational fraud. 
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